

## Universities fear researcher pipeline is under threat

**Yojana Sharma; 08 April 2021**

With increasing global and regional competition for doctoral students to fuel expansion in technology-based industries, even top universities in Asia are beginning to worry about a continued pipeline of well-qualified students in STEM (science, technology, engineering and mathematics) areas as countries expand research in key areas such as artificial intelligence, quantum computing, genetics, nanotechnology, robotics and other areas.

Global competition has been enhanced by the **rivalry between China and the United States in technology**, with the US also pressuring **Europe** and Japan to curb research with China that is deemed sensitive.

For Asian countries attracting foreign STEM PhD students, the largest contingent has come from China. Countries such as Japan are already talking of **more stringent vetting of PhD students** from countries including China for more strategically sensitive PhD subjects, and having to rely on local students or foreign students from other countries in the region.

At the same time Beijing has initiated a campaign to keep PhD students and young researchers at home as it expands in major STEM areas as part of its own **recently announced drive for self-sufficiency in technology**.

Singapore has recently announced **increased research funding** for new emerging high technology areas and expanding doctoral places at its universities.

To read the full article: <https://www.universityworldnews.com/post.php?story=20210408075337556>

## Senate Help Committee Holds Hearing on Foreign Influence in Biomedical Research

Christa Wagner; April 23, 2021

NIH Deputy Director for Extramural Research Michael Lauer, MD, testified on the NIH's efforts to combat foreign influence in biomedical research in [an April 22 hearing before the Senate Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions \(HELP\) Committee](#).

Lauer testified that the NIH's main areas of concern regarding foreign government influence on the NIH research enterprise are the failure of researchers to disclose outside funding from other organizations or foreign governments, "diversion of proprietary information included in grant applications or produced by NIH-supported biomedical research to other entities," and a breach of confidentiality in the peer review system. "As of April 2021, we have contacted more than 90 awardee institutions regarding concerns involving over 200 scientists," he stated.

Lauer reviewed the NIH's actions to prevent these security issues, which include proactively addressing the research community, working with other federal research agencies through the Office of Science and Technology Policy to coordinate resources for grantees, and collaborating with national security agencies such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) Office of National Security (ONS) and Office of Inspector General.

To read the full article: <https://www.aamc.org/advocacy-policy/washington-highlights/senate-help-committee-holds-hearing-foreign-influence-biomedical-research>



### Question:

Is it an export controls violation to give a visiting foreign person a facility tour?

## Russian Foreign Intelligence Service Exploiting Five Publicly Known Vulnerabilities to Compromise U.S. and Allied Networks

April 15, 2021

The National Security Agency (NSA), the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) jointly released a Cybersecurity Advisory, "[Russian SVR Targets U.S. and Allied Networks](#)," today to expose ongoing Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) exploitation of five publicly known vulnerabilities.

To read the full article: <https://www.nsa.gov/News-Features/Feature-Stories/Article-View/Article/2573391/russian-foreign-intelligence-service-exploiting-five-publicly-known-vulnerabili/>

### **POP QUIZ Answer:**

A facility tour itself is not generally regulated by the ITAR or the EAR.

The main export control risk in a facility tour is the potential for a release of controlled technology to the foreign person. The organization providing the tour should carefully consider what the foreign person may be able to see or hear while on-site.

The most conservative approach is to ensure that a tour simply does not involve any technology subject to either the ITAR or the EAR. However, this may not be practical for all types of tours, in which case the organization should classify the technology which may be released and determine if any of it requires a license for disclosure to the foreign person, which may depend in part on his or her nationality(ies).

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