

*From the Desk of Denise Spiller, Director*

## *Office of Research Security*

ORS has implemented a new Kuali form. If you are hosting a meeting on campus that will involve discussions containing Export Control Information, Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI) or classified the **form is required** to be submitted to ORS prior to the meeting date. The form can be found at the ORS website or the link below:

<https://uah.kualibuild.com/app/6812767965e4cb028019f8a1/run>

The Director or an ORS staff member must be notified **as far as in advance as possible** of any meetings that will be scheduled on the UAH campus.

If the meeting is **not classified**, visitors **should not** send a Visit Authorization Request (VAR).

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## US intel shows Russia and China are attempting to recruit disgruntled federal employees, sources say

By Natasha Bertrand, Katie Bo Lillis and Zachary Cohen, CNN

Foreign adversaries including Russia and China have recently directed their intelligence services to ramp up recruiting of US federal employees working in national security, targeting those who have been fired or feel they could be soon, according to four people familiar with recent US intelligence on the issue and a document reviewed by CNN.

The intelligence indicates that foreign adversaries are eager to exploit the Trump administration's efforts to conduct mass layoffs across the federal workforce – a plan laid out by the Office of Personnel Management earlier this week.

Russia and China are focusing their efforts on recently fired employees with security clearances and probationary employees at risk of being terminated, who may have valuable information about US critical infrastructure and vital government bureaucracy, two of the sources said. At least two countries have already set up recruitment websites and begun aggressively targeting federal employees on LinkedIn, two of the sources said.

A document produced by the Naval Criminal Investigative Service said the intelligence community assessed with “high confidence” that foreign adversaries were trying to recruit federal employees and “capitalize” on the Trump administration's plans for mass layoffs, according to a partly redacted copy reviewed by CNN.

It added that foreign intelligence officers were being directed to look for potential sources on LinkedIn, TikTok, RedNote and Reddit.

At least one foreign intelligence officer directed an asset to create a company profile on LinkedIn and post a job advertisement, and to actively pursue federal employees who indicate they are “open to work,” the NCIS document says.

To read the full article:

<https://www.cnn.com/2025/02/28/politics/us-intel-russia-china-attempt-recruit-disgruntled-federal-employees/index.html>



## **Former CIA Official Pleads Guilty to Acting as a Foreign Agent and Mishandling Classified Materials**

Dale Britt Bendler, 68, of Miami, Florida, pleaded guilty today to, while being a public official at the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), acting as a foreign agent required to register under the Foreign Agents Registration Act and removing classified material, classified up to the SECRET//NOFORN level, from authorized locations without authority and with the intent to retain such material at an unauthorized location.

As described in the plea agreement, starting in 2014, Bendler began working as a full-time contractor at the CIA with a Top Secret/Sensitive Compartmented Information (TS/SCI) security clearance. Before he was a CIA contractor, Bendler spent over 30 years working for the CIA as an intelligence officer and retired as a member of the Senior Intelligence Service in 2014. Beginning in July 2017 and continuing through at least July 2020, while a full-time CIA contractor and TS/SCI clearance holder, Bendler worked with a U.S. lobbying firm and engaged in unauthorized and hidden lobbying and public relations activities on behalf of foreign national clients. As described in the plea agreement, Bendler's undisclosed lobbying activities included an attempt to use his position and access at the CIA to influence a foreign government's embezzlement investigation of one of Bendler's foreign national clients and a separate attempt to use his position and access at the CIA to influence the U.S. government's decision as to whether to grant a U.S. visa to another of Bendler's clients, who was alleged to be associated with terrorism financing. In exchange for his unauthorized outside activities, Bendler was paid hundreds of thousands of dollars.

To read the full article: <https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/former-cia-official-pleads-guilty-acting-foreign-agent-and-mishandling-classified-materials>

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