

*From the Desk of Denise Spiller, Director*

## *Office of Research Security (ORS)*

ORS would like to remind everyone of the reporting requirements.

Whether you have upcoming foreign travel, life event like getting married/divorced, inherit a large sum of money as a few examples all of these items are reportable.

Basically, anything you would have listed in your SF 86 is reportable.

Even if you're not sure if something needs to be reported, please contact ORS.

We will be glad to discuss the matter with you – My Door is Always Open 😊

These are Government reporting requirements, not rules made by ORS.

We follow the Security Executive Agent (SecEA) Directive, which establishes reporting requirements for all covered/cleared individuals who have access to classified information or hold a sensitive position.

Nothing in this Directive should be construed to limit the authority of agency heads to impose additional reporting requirements in accordance with their respective authorities under law or regulation.

The Security Executive Agent Directive 3 (SEAD3) (hyperlink is below) is the reporting requirements for personnel with access to classified information or who hold a sensitive position.

<https://www.dni.gov/files/NCSC/documents/Regulations/SEAD-3-Reporting-U.pdf>

### **2025 Annual Security Refresher training:**

- **Tuesday, July 22 at 11:30 am - 12:30 pm, UAH Olin King Technology Hall, S105, Speaker SA Selena Golden**
- **Thursday, August 7 at 11:30 am - 12:30 pm, UAH Olin King Technology Hall, S105, Speaker SA Selena Golden**

## **Two Israelis Arrested on Suspicion of Spying for Iran Amid Open War: Arrests Are Latest in String of Espionage Incidents Uncovered in Recent Months; Details of the Case and Jewish Suspects' Identities Under Gag Order**

By Charlie Summers

A list of cleared, vetted people would serve as a strategic hedge against attrition, espionage and workforce volatility.

Who gets to hold a security clearance? And more importantly, what happens to that eligibility when someone steps out of federal service?

Security clearances are the gatekeepers of the nation's secrets – powerful tools of trust wielded exclusively by the federal government, as delegated by the Executive Branch. That authority has never been more visible than during the Trump administration, when high-profile actions were taken to revoke clearances based on perceived threats or disloyalty. It is a clear reminder: your clearance is not your own.

For decades, the clearance process has been driven by agencies, for agencies. Individuals are granted eligibility, “read into” classified programs, and “read out” again if they switch employers, change contracts, or exit service. That's an optimistic view of the off-boarding process. All too often quick turnaround layoffs, agency shifts, or shifting priorities mean that off-boarding might come in the form of an email – that you may be lucky to access. That leaves laid off cleared workers in limbo, and often concerned about what will happen to their clearance.

Just because you're out of a contract doesn't mean your clearance eligibility goes away. The push toward a more efficient security clearance process has been a push to better reciprocity. But policy is one thing and reality is another. Even with efforts toward reciprocity and “transfer of trust,” the process often defaults to redundant reinvestigations and bureaucratic bottlenecks. When the focus is on the agency, and not the individual, the investment the government has made in a clearance (\$5,410 for a Top Secret clearance investigation conducted by the Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency) isn't treated as the resource it is.

To read the full article: <https://www.timesofisrael.com/two-israelis-arrested-on-suspicion-of-spying-for-iran-amid-open-war/>



## The Spy Among Us: Why the Most Likable Person Might Be the Biggest Threat

By John Davis

Intelligence collectors—whether spies, information brokers, or business adversaries—know how to manipulate human behavior. They exploit your basic honesty and innate agreeableness. This psychological tactic explains why Polish journalists were stunned when a young colleague, believed to be a Spanish freelance journalist, was revealed as a Russian spy. Arrested in Warsaw and later welcomed in Moscow after a multinational spy exchange, he had been perceived as sociable, open, humorous—a trusted peer. Who could have known?

Another example: a man seeking detailed voting data from a few swing states during a recent election turned out to be working for a foreign intelligence agency. While such information may appear harmless, in the wrong hands it can be used to deploy bots, manipulate public opinion, and sway electoral outcomes. Again, who knew?

Espionage has evolved. What once required months of grooming—identifying a target, building trust, and securing cooperation—now often involves more efficient and covert methods. In the past, spies often needed to secure written agreements from recruits to confirm betrayal and maintain control. Today, such formality may not be needed, but the emotional and financial hooks remain strong. Aldrich Ames, for instance, remained loyal to his handlers largely because of the steady stream of cash they provided.

To read the full article: <https://news.clearancejobs.com/2025/06/13/the-spy-among-us-why-the-most-likable-person-might-be-the-biggest-threat/>

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