

CPE496/498 Capstone Design Course

Charger Active Defense Proof of Concept Testbed

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Overview of Project Work

 The goal of Charger Active Defense (ChAD) is to show the feasibility of active cybersecurity defense that crashes or hangs an attacker's tools



using invalid network responses.

 We performed fuzz testing on both existing and AI generated attack tools to find network responses that crashed or hung the tools

Highlight of Requirements

M1	The ChAD fuzzing workflow must conduct network- based fuzzing to identify network responses, also known as Active Defense Responses, that can crash or hang adversarial attack tools.
M4	Must use two different AI/LLM models to generate additional attack tools.
M7	Demonstrate a fuzz testing workflow for Masscan and AI-generated attack tools.
M10	The ChAD program must provide an active defense response.

american fuzzy lo	<pre>p 2.56b (phind_brute)</pre>
process timing run time : 0 days, 0 hrs, 0 m last new path : none seen yet last uniq crash : none seen yet last uniq hang : none seen yet	in, 1 sec in, 1
cycle progress now processing : 0 (0.00%) paths timed out : 0 (0.00%)	<pre>map coverage map density : 0.01% / 0.01% count coverage : 1.00 bits/tuple</pre>
stage progress now trying : bitflip 1/1 stage execs : 59/96 (61.46%)	<pre>findings in depth favored paths : 1 (100.00%) new edges on : 1 (100.00%) tetal caseboa = 0 (0 upicus)</pre>
exec speed : 34.44/sec (slow!) fuzzing strategy yields	total tmouts : 0 (0 unique) path geometry
bit flips : 0/0, 0/0, 0/0 byte flips : 0/0, 0/0, 0/0 arithmetics : 0/0, 0/0, 0/0	pending : 1 pend fav : 0
known ints : 0/0, 0/0, 0/0 dictionary : 0/0, 0/0, 0/0 havoc : 0/0, 0/0	imported : n/a stability : 100.00%
trum : n/a, n/a	[cpu000: 79%]



Our design is split into two primary sections:

• **Fuzzing Workflow:** Includes everything related to finding vulnerabilities within the open source tools

Design

• **ChAD Program**: The replay service for providing network responses to the attacking application

Results/Impact

- Our fuzzing workflow was able to crash 3 out of 6 Al generated attack tools and hang 1 of them.
- We were unable to crash or hang Masscan, our chosen well-known attack tool.
- Could lead to buffer overflow attacks which would allow nation-states to directly retaliate against the attacker (and collect more information on them).