De Natura Deorum Liber Secundus
by Marcus Tullius Cicero
English Summary of Book II |
| Cotta having finished the refutation of the Epicurean
theology, Balbus begins his exposition of the Stoic doctrine. He divides his discourse (§
3), after the traditional custom of the Stoics, into four parts: 1. proof of the existence
of the gods; 2. explanation of their nature and of their various sorts; 3. proof that the
world is governed by them; 4. proof that in particular they have a care for mankind. The
Stoics considered this fourth proposition necessary, because a divine government of the
world is quite conceivable, which might order the whole according to general laws,
bestowing at the same time no especial care on men; still less interfering in particular
cases in their behalf, vouchsafing revelations, giving them support and aid, all of which
the Stoics admitted in conformity with the popular belief. - The existence of the gods is
proved from several points of view. The universality of the belief among all men is first
mentioned, and the confirmation it receives, partly from individual apparitions of divine
beings, partly from the revelations of the gods through divination and auspices (4-12).
Next follows a statement of the reasons assigned by Cleanthes for this universal belief in
the gods; first, the revelations of future events; second, the consideration of the many,
blessings which the order of the universe secures to man; third, the impression made by
the grand, mighty and terrible phenomena of nature; fourth, the contemplation of the
wonderful order and beauty of the heavenly bodies and their motions, which has led men to
recognize the existence of ordering and governing beings (13-15).<1>
Then follows Chrysippus's justification of the belief in the gods, thus concisely stated:
as it is certain that the universe and its everlasting order have not been produced by
human power and human wisdom, so is it equally certain that the being which did produce
them is higher than man. But beings higher than man must be gods; we can conceive nothing
else higher than man, because man alone is endowed with reason, and reason is the highest
possible endowment. If then there exists anything higher than men (and to deny it would be
the most foolish presumption), it follows that there must be gods (16). This argument,
which, as may be seen, takes for granted the idea of the gods as superhuman intelligent
beings and is only directed to show that such beings must of necessity exist, is then
somewhat further developed. It would be foolish to think that the universe was intended to
be an abode for men alone and not for higher beings as well. - Human reason itself,
limited and incomplete as it is, presupposes the existence of a more complete and hence a
divine reason from which it is derived. just as everything which pertains to the bodily
organization of man is derived from elements existing in the world, so must the best in
man, the thinking spirit, be derived from a thinking being existing in the world; and it
would be absurd were we to ascribe to the universe everything except the highest and best
(17, 18) . Finally, the wise order of the world, the connection and interpenetration of
all its parts lead necessarily to the recognition of a divine spirit governing and holding
together the whole (19). Some short propositions of Zeno follow summing up in syllogistic
forms the essentials of the foregoing argument (20-22). Next comes a detailed deduction
from the speculative physics of the Stoics, the preceding proofs having all been drawn
from the point of view of the ordinary human reason. All vegetable and animal life in the
universe depends upon heat; for individual motion and activity can only dwell in what is
endowed with heat; life is only a definite, uniform modo of activity, which proceeds from
the principle of heat existing in all living bodies, and this principle is thus seen to
pervade the whole universe (23, 24). This general prevalence is further evident from the
fact that we find heat in all four of the chief forms of matter, the so-called elements,
earth, water, air and fire. Hence heat is to be regarded as the living principle of the
whole universe (25-28). But this principle must be conceived as possessing consciousness
and reason. For since there exists in all not simple, but composite natural bodies a
superior governing power (hegemonikon), to which all the rest are subordinate, so there
must be a superior governing power in the universe; and since some subordinate parts of
the universe are endowed with reason, the superior parts must also be so endowed; hence
the universe and this all-pervading, all-animating principle must be endowed with reason,
and the universe, since it is penetrated and animated by this principle, must be a being
endowed with reason, divine and possessing in full divine power (29, 30). This principle
is then, as has been said, heat,<2> but a heat much
purer, much more powerful than that which exists in earthly things and which produces life
and consciousness in men and animals, and so all the more sensitive, conscious and
thinking. And since it derives its spring of action not from something external but from
itself; and since whatever is the source of its own activity is, as Plato teaches, soul;
the principle of heat is to be regarded as the soul of the universe, and the universe as a
being possessing a soul (31, 32) : it is at the same time a reasonable and wise being,
because the universe must surely be better than the individual beings which it contains ;
while if it were not reasonable and wise, it would follow that man by the possession of
reason would thereby have the preeminence over the universe (32). - A further proof of the
existence of the deity is drawn from the observed gradation of beings, the higher
succeeding the lower, the more perfect the more imperfect; the sensitive animal, moved by
instincts and desires, standing above the plant which merely grows and nourishes itself,
and man endowed with reason standing above the animal. In like manner there must be above
man a higher grade of beings who are possessed of reason in the highest fullness, which in
man is only incomplete. This grade is that of the deity, hence of the universe which is
the deity and whose perfection cannot, like that of subordinate natures, be diminished by
any limitations or defects whatever (33-36). To strengthen this argument the absurdity and
impossibility of the contrary supposition is pointed out; as also the necessity that the
universe, as the all-embracing all must be perfect in every respect, hence reasonable and
wise, and hence God (37-39). After the divinity of the universe has thus been shown, there follows the proof that the heavenly bodies are also gods. As these consist entirely of the finest ether i.e. the warm principle of fire, they must consequently be living, sensitive and thinking beings. This is true first of the sun, the ethery, fiery nature of which cannot be doubted (40, 41); the other heavenly bodies are also of the substance of ether, hence sensitive and thinking (42). This however follows also from the order and regularity of their motions, which are to be regarded as purely voluntary, depending on a systematic choice, and hence as a proof of their divinity (43, 44). Thus far we have been concerned with the proof of the existence of the gods; next follows the second part, or the question as to their nature. This has already been partially answered in the first part; for having proved the existence of an animating and conserving principle of fire in the universe, and having attributed to it consciousness and reason and also divinity, we have substantially shown that the deity is such an all-pervading, animating, conserving, reasoning principle of fire; furthermore that the universe, as being filled and animated by this principle, is itself to be called God.<3> In beginning, therefore, with the proposition that the universe is God, and in putting it upon the ground that according to universal natural consciousness the deity must be a living being, and the most perfect one, and that nothing answers to this idea better than the universe itself, Balbus only repeats what he had already said under the previous head. He adds to this a hit at the Epicureans who ridiculed this spherical deity (for the Stoics as well as the majority of people believed in the spherical form of the world, while the Epicureans doubted it) (46-48); hence the reasons for this shape of the universe and of the heavenly bodies as well are derived from the movements of the heavens and the stars (49-53); and the argument for the divinity of the heavenly bodies, drawn from the regularity of their movements, is incidentally repeated (54-56). Balbus now makes use of these propositions to establish the Stoic definition of nature given by Zeno, that it is a sort of heat possessing creative energy and working in an intelligent and methodical manner, or in other words the animating and thinking principle of heat before referred to. This nature, so far as it is operative in the universe, may be called the soul of the universe or providence, as being the intelligent force everywhere aiming at adaptation, permanence and beauty (57, 58). Besides the gods whose existence has thus far been proved, namely the universe and the heavenly bodies, wise men, continues Balbus, have for good reasons accepted many others. Desirable and useful things have been regarded as gifts of divine persons and so have been named after the givers; as, for instance, wine and grain are called Liber and Ceres: so also virtues and relations of great importance, which were referred to especial divine influence, like Truth, Virtue, Honor, Unity, Freedom &c. (59-61). Famous men have been deified for their achievements (62). Finally the forces of nature have been personified and natural phenomena clothed in allegories; and this has given rise to a great number of gods and fables relating to them (62-70). It would be in the highest degree foolish to interpret these literally and to believe them; a sensible person will rather take them in their true sense, and regard those gods as nothing more than manifestations of the divine being working in different parts of the universe, to whom we should pay reverence with a true and honest heart. Next follows the third part or the proof that the world is governed by the divine providence. It may be said that this also has been in some degree anticipated in the preceding portion; since the creative and sustaining power, omnipresent in the world, was there represented as the universal soul and providence, endowed with reason, ordering and governing everything with a definite purpose (57, 58); but the Stoics thought it necessary to prove this point independently of the others, though it obliged them to repeat much that had been said before. The proof is of three sorts. First, if we once concede the existence of gods, we must also conceive of them as rulers of the world ; because, if they were not so, they would not deserve to be called gods at all. For it follows from the true general idea of gods that they are subject to no other being external to themselves; that they are wise, mutually bound to a common, intelligent, systematic activity, and that they must direct this activity to the highest and most important object, which is the government of the world (75-80). - The second argument is drawn from the order of the universe, and the correspondence of its parts. All single objects and parts of the world are subject to Nature, by which we are to understand no blind and unconscious force, but one possessing intelligence and working with the highest skill and wisdom. The sum total of the universe too is subject to such a force (81-86). But no one who contemplates the world with its arrangement can doubt that the nature which governs it all is really in the highest degree intelligent and wise; he will be compelled rather to recognize a being which manages and governs it wisely (87-90). The third argument is closely connected with the second, being based upon the contemplation of the heavens and the heavenly bodies in their wonderful order, harmony and beauty (91-129); of the different plants and beasts constituted and endowed with so wondrous adaptation (121); of the manifold productions of the earth conducing to the well-being of various creatures; and of many other things of the same sort which are given at great length (122-132). Cicero omits, however, at the end to draw the definite conclusion that there must be a divine providence which governs the world. He assumes rather as a matter of course that all this is the work of the gods; and draws simply the conclusion that the gods could only have created the world for the sake of thinking, reasoning beings, that is, for themselves and for mankind (122); this is directly followed by the proof of the especial care of the gods for men. The argument consists of a minute description of the wise arrangement and adaptation of the human body (134-149), and the facilities it gives men for procuring their pleasures and satisfying their wants (150-152); especial weight is laid upon reason, which distinguishes man from all other earthly beings, and which enables him to contemplate the heavens and attain to knowledge of the gods; from this come piety and all the other virtues which make man so like the gods that they excel him in hardly anything but immortality. All this cannot possibly be the result of chance. Balbus here nominally begins the fourth part or the proof that men enjoy the particular care of the gods, although what has just preceded might with equal propriety have been arranged under this head. It was, however, so closely connected with the third part that it was drawn into that portion of the discussion. Balbus shows here, in addition, that the whole arrangement of the world, from the heavenly bodies and the succession of the seasons and weather resulting from their motion to the earth with its manifold products, is evidently intended for the advantage of man (154-162). Finally the revelation made to men by the various species of divination, which was used in the beginning of the argument to prove the existence of the gods, is again introduced here to show the divine care for men (162, 163)<4>; this care is shown to be bestowed not only upon the human race in general but upon separate portions and upon individuals who, when distinguished for excellence above their fellows, have owed it chiefly to the help of the favoring gods (164-167). In conclusion Balbus exhorts Cotta to devote his dialectic skill and eloquence rather to the defence of these views than to the destruction of the belief in the gods (168). |
| Footnotes -- <return> hyperlink will take you back
to the footnote number in the text. 1. Aristotle had
already explained in a similar manner the origin of the belief in the gods; first, apo
tôn peri psuchên sumbainontôn, among which he reckoned dreams and revelations;
second, apo tôn meteôrôn, from the contemplation of the heavens and the
heavenly phenomena. See Sext. Empir. adv. I, 20. <return> |
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