De Natura Deorum Liber Primus
by Marcus Tullius Cicero
English Summary of Book I |
| The first book opens with a preface addressed to M. Brutus
stating the subject of the present work, noting its importance in a theoretical and
practical way, and calling attention to the great difference of opinions held upon it by
thinkers from the earliest times (§§ 1-5). Cicero then excuses himself for treating a
subject of this sort as against certain persons who had been surprised at his beginning to
write upon philosophical subjects so late in life, and especially at his preference for
the Academic philosophy; and he closes his defence with the very just remark that it is
precisely on the question of the nature of the gods that this endless variety of opinions
would seem to warrant the attitude of the Academics, who gave up anything like dogmatic
certainty, and contented themselves with simple probability (5-14). He passes on then to
the narrative of a supposed conversation upon this matter between Cotta, Velleius and
Balbus, at which he was present and which forms the subject of the following books. Velleius the Epicurean commences his discourse with a few preliminary remarks against Plato and the Stoics, whose views about the deity as creator of the world and about the divinity of the universe he ridicules as absurd and arbitrary (18-24), and then passes on to a critical summary of all the opinions advanced from the days of Thales down to the Stoic Diogenes of Babylon (25-41)<1>; a summary which, however superficial and unsatisfactory as well in the relation of the opinions themselves as in the reasons adduced against them, is still not without value for the history of philosophy, because no fuller compilation of this sort has come down to us from antiquity. After a cursory glance at the myths of the poets and the fantastic notions of some foreign nations (42, 43) there follows the exposition of the doctrine of Epicurus, as being the first satisfactory solution after so many fruitless attempts. Epicurus starts from the natural and universal consciousness of god as the only sure and irrefragable proof of the existence of the gods. This very consciousness too testifies to their happiness and immortality; from which it further follows, that they neither are occupied about anything nor interfere at all with other beings; they are disturbed by no affections such as love or hate - and so because of the sublimity and excellence of their nature they may be objects of reverence, but never of fear (44, 45). In regard to their form and other matters the data of natural consciousness taken with reasonable inferences lead to the following conclusions: first, that the gods have human forms, because nobody has ever conceived them under any other, none other is more beautiful and more worthy of the gods, and none other is ever found united with reason (46, 47): second, that they have not a coarse material body like an earthly one, cognizable by the senses, but that their bodies consist of an infinitely finer substance which is only quasi body and quasi blood, perceptible not by the senses but by the mind, which is continually and directly affected by impressions (imagines) which flow forth from the gods (48,49). Upon further reflection, to which they prompt the human mind, we arrive at the conception of the gods as happy and immortal beings, in conformity with the law of isonomy or of equal proportion<2>; this law forces us to the conclusion that, as there exists an infinite number of destroying forces, there must also be an infinite number of conserving forces; and in like manner that for the great number of mortal beings there must be an equal number of immortal beings; and we can imagine only the gods as corresponding to this conception (50).<3> But if with the Stoics we suppose the universe itself to be God, or if we accept the existence in the universe of a God that governs it, we only inflict upon the deity a burden and a care, which is in plain contradiction with the idea of happiness (51, 52). Nor is there any need of a divine ruler or creator of the world, since it has arisen from atoms by the force of nature; and not only one, but innumerable worlds have come, are coming and will continue to come into being in the same manner (53, 54). The Stoic doctrine inflicts upon men rulers, of whom they must be in continual dread; it leads to a belief in a necessary fatality, in soothsaying and the like; from which the doctrine of Epicurus makes them free, and inspires them with reverence for the gods without any fear (55, 56). After this exposition of the Epicurean philosophy Cotta commences his discourse in refutation of it. He opens, after a few compliments to Velleius, with the declaration, in conformity with the principles of his school, that he is much more capable of detecting what is false, than of ascertaining what is true; and that he finds himself, with respect to the question in debate, in the same position with the poet Simonides, namely, that the longer he thinks on the subject, the more obscure it seems to him (57-60). He is very far from disputing the existence of the gods; he believes in it heartily; but if it be a question of substituting for this faith a knowledge based upon logical proof, he cannot allow the arguments adduced by Velleius to be convincing. For the circumstance adduced by Velleius, that all men believe in the existence of gods, is neither a proof of that existence, nor itself correct as a matter of fact (61-64). Nor is he any more satisfied with what was said of the essence and nature of the gods. The doctrine of atoms, as being the original elements of all things, is silly and untenable; but even granting it to be true, and so supposing the gods to have arisen from atoms, their immortality would be in contradiction with it (65-68). But in order to be able to maintain this immortality Epicurus takes his usual course when he wishes to escape the consequences of his own principles; he flies to other arbitrary and inconceivable propositions. The gods, says he, are not corporeal, but only quasi corporeal beings.<4> But this quasi corporeality is a word devoid of sense, conveying no idea even to Epicurus and his disciples (69-75). But let this pass, if we will, the case is no better for the assertion that the gods have human forms. The reasons given by the Epicureans in support of this are next refuted one after another; and especially the assertion, that no person can imagine the gods under any other form, is rejected as practically false, since many represent them under the figures of beasts (76-82). But it is quite unworthy of a philosopher to appeal to representations of that sort. A person might with equal justice also maintain that the gods really bear the names that are traditionally used to denote them; and the foolishness of this is directly apparent, when we observe that the same gods are differently called among different nations.<5> If now we may not attribute to the gods either the human form, as we have proved, nor in deference to Epicurus any other form, it would not be venturing too much to deny their existence entirely; yet the Epicureans do not venture this for fear not only of men but also of the gods themselves (83-86). But if the assertion is made that reason can exist only in union with the human form, because we have no experience of it in any other shape, we may answer that it is quite unphilosophical to maintain that a thing of which we have no experience may not for all that have existence (87, 88). Moreover Epicurus ought properly to have said, not that the gods had the form of men, but that men had the form of gods, because the gods, as being immortal, must have existed before men.<6> Or else he must have assumed that, when the human race came into being, chance which brought the atoms together made such a wonderful hit that men sprang up similar to the gods - and it would not be worth the trouble to argue against this (89, 90). But furthermore, the human form would be quite useless to the gods, because they have not the same necessities and occupations to which the human organization is adapted (91-94). And if the human form is still insisted upon for the gods, because without it they cannot possess reason, and hence cannot be happy, the objection must be repeated that it is idle to maintain that reason can only exist in union with the human form because we have never seen it joined with any other, and on the other hand not to see how absurd it is to attribute to the gods limbs and organs for which they can have no possible use, being according to Epicurus entirely without activity of any sort; a view, be it observed, which strips the gods of that very thing which in reality is essential to any happiness (95-102). Suppose we grant that the gods have the human form; where do they live? Do they ever change their abode? And why? Have they any impulses at all? Do they make any use of their reason? Lastly, on what ground are they called immortal and happy? - The only answer the Epicureans have for all these questions is to talk about impressions which flow to us from the gods; and these impressions, they say, received not by the senses, but by the mind, give rise in it to the conception of a happy and immortal being (103-105). Impressions of this sort however, which are simply creatures of the imagination, are more properly called dreams and fancies, and the whole theory is idle talk (106-108). If the immortality of the gods is to be deduced from the law of isonomy, we have just as good a right to conclude that there must be immortal men, because there are mortal men, and men living in the water, because there are men living on land.<7> Finally it remains unexplained, how these impressions can arise from the atoms, and the immortal gods in this way therefore are completely inexplicable (109,110). The case is just as bad in regard to the happiness of the gods. For this cannot exist without virtue, and virtue without action is inconceivable. If with the Epicureans we place happiness in sensual enjoyment, this is itself inconceivable in the case of such gods (111,112). There remain then only freedom from pain and the consciousness of eternal, never-ending comfort. But this is beset with difficulties; for we cannot understand how with the continual stream of atoms flowing in upon them, and taking form again flowing forth from them, the gods can have any certainty of never being annihilated. So then the Epicurean god is no more happy than he is immortal. When Epicurus speaks of piety and reverence for the gods, those are only phrases with no basis of truth; for nobody can feel reverence for such gods as his (113-116). And when he boasts of freeing men from superstition, that is all very easy if at the same time you substantially abolish the belief in the gods; the same boast may be made by those who deny the existence of any gods (117-119). Democritus too, from whom Epicurus borrowed the greater part of his doctrine, gives no satisfactory teaching about the gods, although he allows them at least to exercise a benevolent or a harmful influence on men; but Epicurus annihilates all religion out and out, and Posidonius is quite right in saying that Epicurus really did not believe in any gods, but only made a pretense of doing so, in order to avoid unpopularity (120-124). This is the summary
of the first book; a few observations on the Academic's criticism of the theology of
Epicurus have been already made in the notes; but it may not be amiss to weigh it a little
more carefully. Any person possessing a moderate acquaintance with the history of ancient
philosophy and the contests of the various schools knows that the fighting was not always
done with fair weapons, but that misrepresentation and unjust deductions from the
adversaries' propositions were not uncommon. There is no want of this in Cotta's
discourse. We must recognize the reproach as well founded that the Epicurean theology
undermined and destroyed all religion worthy of the name; and when Epicurus
notwithstanding this talked of pious reverence for the gods because of their essential
excellence, we may at least doubt whether he was really in earnest. So far as we can see
from the remains of his writings or those of his followers, the idea of eusebeia
was limited simply to a belief in the immortality and perfect happiness of the gods, and
the rejection of all such conceptions as were inconsistent with it; and these included not
only the mythological fables and many perverted and contradictory notions of the common
crowd, but the teachings of other philosophers as well, who ascribed to the gods the
government of the world and a care for earthly and human affairs; for Epicurus thought
that this would give the gods an occupation so troublesome, burdensome and vexatious, that
such a thing as happiness would be for them impossible. If the Epicureans did not entirely
withdraw from the traditional rites of religion, they did so chiefly in order to give no
offence, which might perhaps have brought them into danger (Plutarch, Non posse suav.
vivi etc., ch. 21); they did not disdain even to hold the priestly offices (Lucian,
conviv. s. Lapith., ch. 9); and it is quite credible, as Cicero assures us (ch. 30, 85),
that many of them, however freethinking they may have been in theory, were yet in practice
exceedingly superstitious. Similar contradictions between theory and practice have always
been common in this matter.<8> |
| Footnotes -- <return> hyperlink will take you back
to the footnote number in the text. 1. We know from the
Hercul. Fragm. (see Full Introduction) and from
Lucret. I, 635-920 that the Epicureans were accustomed to commence the exposition of their
own doctrine with a criticism of other systems of natural philosophy. <return> |
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