X. 33. Laelius. Hear
then, my excellent friends, the discussions which very often used to take place between
Scipio and myself about friendship. Now he used to say that nothing was more difficult
than that a friendship should last right up to the last day of a man's life. It often
happened, he said, either that the same thing was not advantageous to two friends, or that
the same opinion in politics was not held by both of them. Again, the characters of men
also change, sometimes through adversity, anon by the growing burden of old age. He used
to find instances of these changes by referring to the early days of life, inasmuch as the
warmest affections of boys were often laid aside at the same time as the child's garb,
(34) and even supposing they had continued their friendship to manhood, yet it was
nevertheless sometimes broken off by rivalry for a marriage alliance, or some other
advantage which they could not both secure. But if some had lived on still longer in
friendship, it was nevertheless often shaken should they have become competitors for
office; for nothing was a greater bane to friendship than the desire for money felt by the
average man, and the strife for office and glory waged by all the nobler citizens. From
this cause the most bitter enmity had often arisen between the dearest friends.
35. In the next place, he would say, great dissensions, and those for the
most part justifiable ones, arose, when something that was not right was demanded from
friends, so that they should be either the ministers of lust, or abettors in injustice.
And those who refused, though they did so from an honourable motive, were none the less
charged with neglecting the claims of friendship by those whom they are unwilling to
oblige; but those who dared to make any and every demand from a friend, by that very
demand professed that they would do everything for the sake of a friend. Through perpetual
complaints of these men, not only were friendships broken up, but eternal hatreds produced
as well. These numerous causes, fatalities, so to speak, were ever threatening
friendships, so that he used to say, that it seemed to him to require not only wisdom, but
good fortune as well, to escape them all. |
XI. 36. Wherefore let us
first, if you please, investigate the point, how far affection ought to proceed in
friendship. If Coriolanus had friends, was it their duty to carry arms against their
country with Coriolanus? Was it the duty of the friends of Spurius Cassius Vecellinus and
of Maelius to assist them, when aiming at kingly power? 37. We saw Tiberius Gracchus
indeed, when he was causing confusion in the state, deserted by Quintus Tubero and such of
his contemporaries as were his friends. But Gaius Blossius of Cumae, the friend of your
family, Scaevola, came to me to pray for pardon when I was present as one of the committee
of advice to consuls Laenas and Rupilius, and the plea that he brought forward to induce
me to pardon him, was to the effect that he had esteemed Tiberius Gracchus so highly, that
he thought it his duty to do whatever his friend wished. Then said I: "What, even if
he wished you to set fire to the Capitol?" "That", he replied, "he
would never have wished; but had he done so, I should have obeyed him." You see, what
an impious utterance! And, by Hercules, he did so or even more than he said he would: for
he was a follower of the infatuation of Tiberius Gracchus, but its director, and he did
not show himself the companion of Gracchus' mad folly, but its leader. And so, being in
this state of frenzy and terrified by the newly-appointed court on enquiry, he fled into
Asia, went over to the enemy, and paid a penalty to the state which was both severe and
well deserved. It is therefore no excuse for a sin, if one commits it for the sake of a
friend. For since it was the belief in your virtue that won his friendship, it is
difficult for the friendship to remain if you have abandoned virtue.
38. But supposing we lay it down as a right principle, either to grant to
friends whatever they may wish, or to get from them whatever we may wish, the principle
would be sound if we were to prove to be men of perfect wisdom; but we are speaking of
those friends who are before our eyes, whom we have seen or about whom we have heard by
tradition, with whom everyday life is acquainted. From their number we must take our
examples, and especially indeed from those who approach nearest to wisdom. 39. We see that
Papus Aemilius was the intimate friend of Luscinus,--so we have learned from our
fathers,--that they were twice consuls together, and colleagues in the censorship; and it
is related, that in those days Manius Curius and Titus Coruncanius were most intimate both
with them and with each another. Therefore we cannot even suspect that any one of these
made the slightest demand from his friend that violated a promise or an oath, or was
detrimental to his country. For as to a request of this kind, what need to say that if any
of these men had made it, he would not have obtained his wish? Certainly not, since they
were the purest of men, and it just as wrong to grant a request of this kind as to ask it.
But truly Gaius Carbo and Gaius Cato used to take the part of Tiberius Gracchus, as did
his brother Gaius, who then was by no means active, but is now exceedingly so. |
XII. 40. Let this law
therefore be enacted in friendship, that we neither ask anyone to pursue a dishonourable
course, nor follow it ourselves when asked to do so. For such an excuse is disgraceful,
and one by no means to be accepted in the case of any wrongful act; but it is especially
so if one avows that he has injured the state for the sake of a friend. For we are now
placed, Fannius and Scaevola, in such a position, that it is our duty to look out
beforehand for the disasters that are fated to come upon the state. Our traditional policy
has already swerved far aside from its wonted course and career. 41. Tiberius Gracchus
endeavoured to seize kingly power, or rather for a few months was actually king. Had the
Roman people either heard or seen anything like it? And what his friends and relations,
following in the steps of the dead leader, have done in the case of Publius Scipio, I
cannot relate without tears. We bore with Carbo as patiently as we could, owing to the
recent punishment of Tiberius Gracchus; but what I forbode with regard to the tribuneship
of Gaius Gracchus, I hardly dare predict. The evil soon waxes, and when once it has taken
a start, it glides with increasing speed down the road to ruin. You see, in the case of
the ballet box what great corruption has already been caused, first by the Gabinian law,
and two years afterward by the Cassian. I think I already see the populace at loggerheads
with the senate, and the most important measures carried by the caprice of the multitude.
More men will learn how these things come to pass than how they can be resisted.
42. But what is my object in making these remarks? This, that without comrade
no one attempts anything so outrageous. We must therefore instruct all good men, that if
by some chance they should unawares fall into a friendship of this nature, they are not to
consider themselves so rigidly bound by their friendship as not to quit their friends when
they are sinning in some important public matter; against the wicked however we must enact
a penalty, equally sever to followers and to leaders in impiety. In Greece who was more
distinguished or more powerful than Themistocles? This man, when commander-in-chief in the
Persian war, freed Greece from slavery, but was afterwards driven into exile through his
unpopularity. But instead of patiently enduring the wrong inflicted on him by his
ungrateful country, as was his duty, he acted in the same wise as Coriolanus twenty years
before had done among us. These men found no one to support them against their country,
and each fell by his own hand.
43. Wherefore such an agreement among wicked men, instead of being sheltered
beneath the cloak of friendship, must rather be visited with every punishment, so that no
one may think it permissible to follow a friend even when he is waging war upon his native
land. Yet this extremity, considering the way matters have begun to tend, will, I am
convinced, some day come about; and to me it is a matter of not less anxiety, what the
state will be like after my death, than what it is like today. |
XIII. 44. So let this be
enacted as the first law of friendship--to seek what is honourable from our friends, to do
what is honourable for them, and not even to wait until we are asked. Let zeal ever be
present, and hesitation absent; and let us dare to give advice with all freedom. Let the
authority of friends who give good counsel have the most weight in friendship, and let it
be employed in warning not merely with frankness, but even with sternness, if the occasion
shall demand; and when it is so employed, let obedience follow. 45. Now I believe that
certain men, who I hear have been considered wise in Greece, have held some strange
doctrines--there is really nothing which those men do not worry to death with their
hair-splitting. Some of them say that too warm friendships must be avoided, so that it may
not be necessary for one man to be anxious for a multitude. Every man has enough and more
than enough to do with his own troubles: it is a nuisance to be too much involved in the
affairs of others. It is most convenient to hold the reins of friendship as loosely as
possible, so that you can tighten or slacken them at your pleasure: for the chief
consideration towards a happy life is, so they assert, freedom from care, and the mind
cannot enjoy this if one man is, as it were, in labour for many.
46. And it is said that others of these wise thinkers affirm in a much more
brutal strain--I touched briefly upon this topic a little time ago--that friendships are
to be sought after for the sake of protection and assistance, not of kindly feeling or
affection; and therefore the less steadfastness and strength a man has, the more he
desires friendships, whence it happens that weak women seek the protection of friendships
more than men, the poor more than the rich, and people in distress more than those who are
considered prosperous.
47. What surpassing wisdom! Why, they seem to take away the sun from the
universe when they take away friendship from life, than which we have received no nobler
or more blessed gift from the immortal gods. What is that freedom from care? In appearance
it is indeed seductive, but in reality to be rejected on many grounds. It is unbecoming to
refuse to undertake any honourable business or course of action, or to lay it aside when
it has been undertaken, simply from the fear of being troubled by it. Now if we flee from
anxiety, we must flee from virtue as well, and virtue must needs with some anxiety despise
and abominate her opposite, even as kindness of heart loathes ill-will, and self-control
hates lust, and bravery hates cowardice. And therefore you will find that it is the just
who are most indignant at injustice, the brave who most resent cowardice, the law-abiding
who most resent an outrage. Thus it is characteristic of a well-ordered mind to rejoice at
good things and feel pain at the opposite.
48. Hence, if grief of mind befalls the wise man--and assuredly it does
befall him, unless we are to suppose that all human feeling is rooted from his
breast--what reason is there for us to utterly banish friendship from life, merely to
avoid undergoing some troubles because of it? For take away the emotions of the mind, and
what difference is there, I do not say between a beast and a man, but between a man and a
log or a stone, or anything of the same kind? We must not listen to those men, who want to
make out that virtue is a certain hard and, as it were, iron quality: on the contrary, it
is in many things, and in friendship especially, gentle and pliant, so that it is, so to
speak, expanded by a friend's prosperity and contracted by his misfortunes. Consequently
that pain, which must often be felt on a friend's account, is not so potent as to banish
friendship from life, any more than that the virtues should be rejected because they bring
with them some anxieties and troubles. |
XIV. Since however a man
contracts a friendship, as I have said above, if any sign of virtue shines forth in
another to which a like disposition may incline and attach itself; when this happens, love
must needs arise. 49. For what is so unreasonable as to be delighted with many empty
things, such as office, glory, a house, or the clothing and adornment of the body, and not
to be delighted beyond measure with a living creature endowed with virtue, and which can
either love, or, as I may say, love back? For there is nothing more delightful than the
repayment of kindly feeling, nothing more delightful than the interchange of affection and
of good offices.
50. And suppose we also add this remark, which can be added with perfect
truth, that nothing so allures and attracts anything to itself as likeness of disposition
attracts men to friendship. It will assuredly be acknowledged as a truth that the good
love the good, and attach them to themselves just as though they were bound to them by a
kind of relationship and natural affinity. For nothing is more eager and greedy for things
like itself than Nature. Wherefore let this point, Fannius and Scaevola, be established,
that, as I think, there is between good men and good men a necessary feeling of
kindliness, and this has been appointed by Nature as the fountain-head of friendship. But
the kindliness also extends to the multitude. For virtue is not unfeeling or unserviceable
or haughty, since she is wont to protect even whole nations, and consult their interests
in the best manner, which she assuredly would not do if she shrank from kindness towards
the common people.
51. And again, those who conceive friendships to exist for the sake of
expediency, seem to me to take away the tenderest bond of friendship. For it is not so
much the advantage obtained through a friend as a friend's love that delights us, and that
which has proceeded from a friend becomes delightful only if it has proceeded from
affection; and so far is it from being the case, that friendships are cultivated on
account of poverty, that those who, by reason of their wealth and their resources, and
their virtue in particular, in which there is the greatest protection, are least in need
of another, are the most generous and the most ready to confer a favour. And yet I should
rather fancy that it is not indispensable for friends never to lack for anything at all.
For how could our zealous affection have displayed its activity, if Scipio had never
needed my advice or help, either at home or in the army? Therefore friendship is not the
result of advantage, but advantage of friendship. |
XV. 52. Accordingly, men
who are enervated by luxury must not be listened to if they ever hold discussions on
friendship, of which they have no experience either in practice or theory. Who, by the
faith of gods and men, would wish to overflow with wealth and to live amid an abundance of
all things on condition that he should neither love anyone nor be himself loved by anyone?
This, of course, is the life of tyrants, in which there can be neither confidence, nor
affection, nor firm reliance on the kindly feeling of others: their whole life is full of
mistrust and anxiety, and for friendship there is no room.
53. For who could love either a man whom he fears, or a man by whom he thinks
he is feared? Yet tyrants are courted through hypocrisy, at least for a season. But if, as
usually happens, they chance to fall, then men see how poor they were in friends. And so
Tarquinius is related to have said when in exile, that he knew at last which of his
friends were faithful and which unfaithful, since then he could show gratitude to neither.
54. And yet I am surprised that a man of his haughtiness and perversity could have any
friend. Again, just as the character of this man, whom I have mentioned, could not procure
true friends, so the riches of many who are very powerful makes a faithful friendship
impossible. For not only is fortune herself blind, but she also generally blinds those
whom she has embraced. So they are as a rule carried away by disdain and obstinacy, nor
can anything more unbearable be found than a fool favoured by fortune. And we can see,
that those who before were of obliging character, are changed by military power, and
office, and properity; old friendships are despised by them, and new ones indulged in.
55. Yet what is more foolish than for men who have unlimited power through
their riches, resources, and influence, to procure everything else which money can
buy--horses, slaves, fine raiment, costly vases--and not to procure friends, the best and
most beautiful furniture of life, so to speak? When they procure the other things, they
know not for whom they are procuring them, nor for whose sake they toil,--for each of
these things belongs to him who has prevailed by his strength,--whereas the possession of
friendships remains sure and certain to all; so that, even should there remain to them
those things which are as it were the gifts of fortune, still a life that is barren and
destitute in respect of friends cannot be pleasant. But enough on this point. |
XVI. 56. We must now
determine, what are in friendship the limits and, as it were, the bounds of loving. I see
that three opinions are expressed about these limits, none of which I approve. The first
is, that we should feel towards a friend just as we do towards ourselves; the second, that
our kindly feeling towards our friends should answer to the same extent and degree to
their kindly feeling towards us; the third, that a man should be estimated by his friends
at the same value he sets upon himself. 57. With no one at all of these three opinions do
I agree. The first is not true, namely, that a man should feel towards his friend as he
feels towards himself. For how many things there are which we should never do for our own
sake, that we do for the sake of our friends! Begging and praying of one that is unworthy,
attacking a man with great bitterness and railing at him vehemently--things which would be
altogether improper in our own affairs--can be done with the utmost honor in the affairs
of our friends. And there are many circumstances in which good men subtract much from
their own advantages, or suffer much to be subtracted, that their friends rather than
themselves may enjoy it.
58. The second opinion is that which limits friendship by an equal
interchange of benefits and kindly feeling. This indeed is to call friendship to a
reckoning with overmuch meanness and illiberality, so that the account of what is received
and what is disbursed may balance. True friendship appears to me to be richer and more
bountiful, and not to watch narrowly, lest it should pay more than it has received. A
friend must not be afraid lest something should be lost, or should fall to the ground, or
lest more than what is fair be heaped upon the measure of friendship.
59. But that third limit is the worst, that a man should be estimated by his
friends at the value at which he estimates himself. For often, in some men, either their
spirit is too crushed, or the hope of mending their fortune is too broken. It is not
therefore the part of a friend to be towards him such as he is towards himself, but rather
to strive and bring it about, that he may raise his friend's dejected spirits, and lead
him on to more cheerful hopes and thoughts. I shall therefore have to set up another limit
of true friendship, as soon as I have stated what Scipio reserved for his severest
censure. He used to say that no utterance could have been found more hostile to friendship
than that of him who had said, that one ought to love in such a way as if some time or
other he was likely to hate; and that he refused to believe that this sentiment was, as
currently supposed, uttered by Bias, who was considered a wise man, and one of the Seven.
It was rather, he considered, the opinion of some degraded or selfish wretch, or of one
who regarded all things as they affected his own influence. For how can anyone possibly be
a friend to a man to whom he thinks he may perhaps become an enemy? Why, it will be
necessary to desire and pray that a friend may sin as often as possible, in order that he
may offer the more handles, if I may so speak, for catching hold of him; and on the other
hand, it will be necessary to be vexed, grieved, and envious at the good actions and
advantages of friends.
60. Wherefore this precept, to whomsoever it may belong, tends to destroy
friendship; it should rather have taken this form, that we ought to exercise such
vigilance in forming friendships, that we never begin to love a man whom we could possibly
come to hate. Nay further, if we should have been unfortunate in loving, Scipio thought
that we should exercise patience rather than cast about for an opportunity for a quarrel. |
XVII. 61. I think
therefore we must adopt these limits: when the character of friends is free from faults,
let there be complete community of all things, of plans and wishes, without any exception:
so that, even if it should happen by some chance that it is necessary to forward a
friend's unjust wishes, in which either his status as a citizen or his reputation is at
stake, we must deviate from the straight path, provided only that no very deep disgrace
follows; for there is a point up to which indulgence can be granted to friendship. We must
not, however, neglect our own reputation, nor ought we to consider the goodwill of our
fellow-citizens an unimportant weapon in public life, though it is disgraceful to try to
win it by wheedling and flattery. Least of all must we abandon virtue, which brings
affection with it as a matter of course.
62. Scipio was wont to complain--I often return to him from whom came the
whole of this discourse concerning friendship--that men used to take greater pains in
everything than in friendship. Every man, he declared, could tell how many goats and sheep
he had, yet knew not the number of his friends. In procuring the former men exercised
care, while in choosing friends they were negligent, and had not, as it were, signs and
marks by which they might discover those who were suited for friendship. The firm, the
steadfast, and the constant ought therefore to be chosen; but of this kind there is a
great scarcity, and it is indeed difficult to form a judgment, except for one that is
experienced; and experience must be gained in friendship itself. So friendship outstrips
the judgment, and takes away our opportunity of gaining experience.
63. It is therefore a prudent man's way to check the impulse to kindly
feeling, just as he would a horse's speed, in order that we may indulge in friendship only
when our friends' characters have been in some degree tested, just as we do with tried
steeds. The fickleness of certain men is often discovered in the case of a small sum of
money, while others, whom a small sum could not have affected, are found out when a large
sum is in question. But suppose there shall be some found who think it mean to prefer
money to friendship, where shall we find those who do not place public office,
magistracies, military commands, civil authority, influence, above friendship, so that
when these things are put before them on one side, and on the other the claims of
friendship, they do not much rather prefer the former? For our nature is weak when it is a
question of despising power; and even if men have obtained power by neglecting friendship,
they think that this neglect will be concealed, because it is not without good cause that
friendship has been disregarded.
64. Therefore true friendships are very rarely found among those who are
busied in public office and affairs of state; for where would you find the man who would
prefer the political advancement of his friend to his own? Why, to pass over this point,
how burdensome and hard does an association in misfortune appear to most men, and it is
not easy to find people who would care to face it! And yet Ennius rightly says, "A
friend in need is a friend indeed." Still these two things convict most men of
fickleness and weakness--if in their own prosperity they despise a friend, or in his
adversity desert him. |
XVIII. Accordingly, the
man who shows himself under both these conditions, true, consistent, and steady in the
matter of friendship, we ought to consider to belong to an especially rare and almost
divine class of men.
65. Now the foundation of firmness and constancy is the loyalty of him whom
we seek in friendship: for nothing is firm which is without loyalty. Besides, it is right
that for a friend one should be chosen who is frank, sociable, and sympathetic--and by
sympathetic I mean one who is affected by the same circumstances as ourselves; all these
qualities have to do with loyalty. A nature that is deceitful and tortuous cannot be
loyal; nor indeed can a man who is not affected by the same circumstances as ourselves,
and is not naturally sympathetic, be either loyal or firm. To these characteristics we
must add, that he shall not take delight in bringing forward charges against another, or
believe them when they are made--qualities which all have to do with that constancy of
which I have now for some time been treating. So that is shown to be true which I said at
the beginning: friendship cannot exist except among the good. For it is the part of a good
man, whom we may also call a wise man, to hold fast these two things in friendship: first
to see that there be nothing feigned or pretended in him, for it is more characteristic of
one who is frank to show his hatred openly than to conceal his real feeling behind a mask;
next, not only to repel the charges brought by someone against a friend, but himself to
abstain from suspicion, and from always imagining that some infidelity has been committed
by his friend. 66. There ought to be added to this a certain pleasantness of conversation
and manners, which is a seasoning of no mean importance to friendship. Now sternness and
hardness on all occasions bring with them dignity indeed, but friendship ought to be less
strict, more free, more pleasant, and more inclined to all forms of courtesy and friendly
intercourse. |
