MARCUS TULLIUS CICERO'S
BOOK: LAELIUS ON FRIENDSHIP
|
I. 1. Quintus Mucius
Scaevola, the Augur, used to relate many a tale about Gaius Laelius, his father-in-law,
with perfect memory and in a pleasant style, nor did he hesitate whenever he spoke to call
him Wise. Now I, on assuming the dress of manhood, had been introduced to Scaevola by my
father with the idea that, so far as I could and it was permitted me, I should never quit
the old man's side. And so I used to commit to memory many able arguments, and many terse
and pointed sayings of his, and I was all on fire to become, by his skill, more learned in
the law. And when he died, I betook myself to Scaevola the Pontifex, who I venture to say
was beyond doubt the man in our state most distinguished for ability and justice. But I
will speak of him another time; I now resume my remarks about the Augur.
2. I remember much that he said on many occasions, but especially that once,
when he was at home sitting according to his wont upon a fauteuil, myself and a
very few intimate friends being with him, he fell into a discourse on a subject which
happened at that time to be on many people's lips. For of a surety, Atticus, you remember,
and remember all the more vividly because you were a close friend of Publius Sulpicius,
how deep was men's surprise and disgust when he, as tribune of the people, was estranged
by a deadly feud from the then consul, Quintus Pompeius, a man with whom he had lived in
the strongest bonds of affection.
3. And so at that time, since Scaevola had chanced to mention that very
occurrence, he set forth to us that discourse concerning friendship which Laelius had held
with him and his other son-in-law, Gaius Fannius, the son of Marcus Fannius, a few days
after the death of the younger Africanus. I committed to memory the chief opinions
maintained in that conversation, and I have set them forth in this book in my own way; for
I have brought upon the boards the very men themselves, so to speak, in order that the
words 'say I', and 'says he' might not be scattered too thickly, and that the discussion
might seem to be held as it were by men present face to face.
4. For since you often pleaded with me to write something about Friendship,
the subject seemed to me worthy alike of the consideration of all and our own friendship
in particular. Therefore I have taken pains--no unwilling task--to benefit many at your
request. But, just as in the "Cato Major," which I dedicated to you, on the
subject of Old Age, I introduced Cato discussing it in his old age, because no personage
appeared to me more fit to speak of that time of life than he, who had not only been an
old man for a very long time, but had also even in his old age outstripped other men in
prosperity; so, since we had learned from our fathers that the friendship of Gaius Laelius
and Publius Scipio was especially proverbial, the personage of Laelius seemed to me a
proper one to set forth those very points about friendship which Scaevola had called to
mind as having been discussed by him. Now this kind of discourse seems in some strange way
to have more weight, if it rests on the authority of men of old, particularly such as are
famous; and so, when I myself am reading my own writings, a feeling at times comes over
me, that I imagine Cato, and not myself, to be speaking.
5. And just as in the De Senectute I as an old man wrote to an old man on the
subject of old age, so in this volume I, the sincerest of friends, have written to a
friend about friendship. In my former book the spokesman was Cato, than whom there was
hardly anybody of greater age in those days and none wiser; while in this treatise
Laelius, who was both wise (for so he was esteemed) and distinguished for the celebrity of
his friendship, shall speak about friendship. I should like you for a little while to turn
your attention from me, and fancy Laelius himself to be speaking. Gaius Fannius and
Quintus Mucius come to their father-in-law after the death of Africanus; the conversation
is opened by them and Laelius replies. To him belongs the whole of this discourse about
friendship, and while reading it you will recognize your own portrait. |
II. 6. Fannius.
Quite true, Laelius; a better man or a greater than Africanus never lived. But you ought
to consider that the eyes of all are turned upon you, and men both style and think you
wise. This title was a little while since bestowed upon Marcus Cato, and we know that
Lucius Acilius was in the time of our fathers called "the Wise." Each however
was so styled in a somewhat different manner: Acilius was "the Wise" because he
was reputed to be skilled in civil law; Cato, because he had experience in many things.
Many stories used to be related of his wise foresight, his resolute action, and his shrewd
answers, alike in the senate and in the forum; and therefore by the time he reached old
age he had already acquired the surname, so to speak, of "the Wise."
7. You however we know to be wise after another fashion; you are wise, not
only by nature and character, but also by your industry and learning; "wise,"
not in the sense in which the common crowd but the learned are wont to call a man
"wise." Such an one, we have heard, there was not in the rest of Greece; for
those who enquire into these matters with more than usual exactness do not include those
who are termed the Seven in the class of "wise" men; while at Athens there was
one only, and he indeed adjudged by the oracle of Apollo to be the wisest of all. Men
think such wisdom to be in you, that you hold all your happiness to rest upon yourself,
and regard the chances of man's life as of less might than virtue. Therefore they enquire
of me, and I believe of Scaevola here as well, in what manner you bear the death of
Africanus; and the more so, because on these last Nones when we had come, as is our
custom, into the pleasure grounds of Decimus Brutus the Augur for the purpose of
practising our art, you were not present, though you had always been accustomed to pay the
most careful attention to that day and that duty.
8. Scaevola. Many people do indeed enquire, Gaius Laelius, as
Fannius has said; but I reply to them just what I have observed--that you bear with
resignation the grief you have suffered by reason of the death of a man who was not only
very great, but your dearest friend; that you could not fail to be affected, nor was such
insensibility possible to your gentle disposition; and as to the fact that you were not
present on these last Nones at the meeting of our college, your weak health and not your
sorrow was the cause.
Laelius. You answer indeed aright, Scaevola, and truly: for I had no
right to withdraw through any trouble of my own from that duty, which I have always
performed regularly when I was well, nor do I think it can happen by any chance to a man
of principle, that he should neglect a duty.
9. Now you, Fannius, speak as a friend when you say that so much is ascribed
to me by people--such a tribute I neither acknowledge nor demand; but, in my opinion, you
do not judge rightly concerning Cato. For either he was a wise man, or else no one was
ever wise --the alternative to which I rather incline. To omit other circumstances, with
what firmness did he endure his son's death! Now I remembered Paulus, and I had seen
Galus; but the sons they lamented were mere children, whereas Cato's grief was aroused by
the death of a full grown and distinguished man.
10. Wherefore be not hasty to prefer to Cato even that man himself whom
Apollo, as you say, judged to be wisest of all; for men praise Socrates' words, but Cato's
deeds. Of myself however, to speak now with both of you, form your opinion thus. |
III. Were I to deny that I
feel the loss of Scipio, how far I should do so aright I must leave the wise to judge; it
would certainly be a lie. For I am sore grieved at being bereft of a friend, the like of
whom, as I think, there never will be again--the like of whom, as I think, there never
will be again--the like of whom, as I can confidently assert, there never was before. But
I have no need of a remedy; I console myself, and especially with the comforting thought,
that I am free from the delusion wherewith on the decease of friends most men are wont to
be tormented. No misfortune, I think, has happened to Scipio; misfortune, if it has
happened at all, has fallen upon me; but to be grievously tormented by one's own
discomforts is characteristic of one who loves not his friend but himself.
11. Who however would deny that Scipio's career was most glorious? For unless
he chose to covet immortality, --a desire which never entered his mind--what of all it is
lawful for a man to desire did he fail of obtaining? As a youth, he forthwith by his
marvellous merit surpassed the lofty hopes which his fellow-countrymen had already
conceived of him when he was but a boy. He was never a candidate for the consulship, yet
was made consul twice; on the first occasion before the legal age, on the second, as
regards himself at a fitting age, on the second, as regards himself at a fitting age, but
as regards the commonwealth almost too late. Two cities most hostile to this empire did he
overthrow, and thus extinguished not only present but also future wars. What can I say of
his courtesy, his affection towards his mother, his generosity to his sisters, his
kindness towards his relatives, his justice towards all? They are well known to you.
Moreover how beloved he was by the state, men showed by their grief at his funeral. How
then could a few years more have benefited him? For although old age is not a burden, as I
remember Cato explained to Scipio and myself the year before he died, nevertheless it
takes away that vigour which was still Scipio's.
12. Wherefore his life indeed was such in respect of both fortune and fame,
that nothing could be added to it, while the suddenness of his death took away the
consciousness of dying. Concerning a death of this nature it is difficult to make any
positive assertion, but you are aware what men suspect. We may however make this one
statement with truth, that out of the many days, full of the greatest festivity and joy,
which he saw in his lifetime, that day was the most glorious, when, after the senate had
broken up, he was escorted home at eventide by the conscript fathers, the Roman people,
the allies and Latins. That was the days before he died. From so high a position of
dignity, he seems rather to have reached a place among those above, that is the gods, than
those below. |
IV. 13. I do not agree with
those who have of late begun to argue, that the soul perishes with the body, and that
everything is blotted out by death. I am more influenced by the authority of the ancients,
whether they be our own forefathers, who paid to the dead the most ceremonious rites,
which assuredly they would not have done if they had thought that nothing affected them;
or whether they be those who once dwelt in this land, and by their principles and maxims
instructed Magna Graecia, which now indeed is destroyed, but was then flourishing; or
whether it be the man who was judged by the oracle of Apollo to be the wisest of all. On
this subject, he was not wont to teach first this doctrine and then that, as he did on
most points, but was always true to one opinion; the souls of men, he believed, came from
God, and when they had departed from the body, a return to heaven lay open to them, all
the speedier in proportion as a man was more virtuous and just.
14. Scipio too believed this, and, just as though he had a presentiment, a
few days before his death, when Philus and Manilius were present and several others, and
you also, Scaevola, had come with me, he discoursed for three days concerning the
Commonwealth; and the end of this discussion chiefly death with the immortality of souls,
thing which he said he had learnt in his sleep from the elder Africanus through a vision.
If it is the case that the souls of all the best men most easily escape in death from the
prison-house, so to speak, and the bonds of the body, to whom can we think that the
passage to the gods was easier than to Scipio? Wherefore to sorrow for the fate that has
befallen him would, I fear, be more like one who envied him than a friend. But if that
other opinion is more true, that the same destruction involves soul and body, and no
consciousness remains, though there is nothing good in death, yet is there nothing evil.
For when consciousness has been lost, it is with a man as though he had not been born at
all; still, for the fact that he was born both we rejoice, and this State, so long as it
shall last, will be glad.
15. Therefore, as I said above, the fates have been most propitious to him,
to me less kind; for it had been more fitting that I who entered life first should quit it
first. Still I enjoy the recollection of our friendship so keenly that my life seems to
have been a happy one, because it was passed with Scipio. He shared my cares about public
and private matters alike; with him I spent my life at home and in the army, and--a
circumstance wherein lies the whole strength of friendship--we had the most profound
agreement in wishes, pursuits, and opinions. Therefore it is not so much my reputation for
wisdom, which Fannius mentioned just now, that delights me, especially as it is unfounded,
as that I hope the recollection of our friendship will last forever; and I have this the
more at heart, since from time immemorial hardly three or four pairs of friends are
mention, and in this class I think I may hope that the friendship of Scipio and Laelius
will be known to posterity.
16. Fannius. Your hope, Laelius, will certainly come to pass. But
since you have made mention of friendship, and we are at leisure, you will confer a great
favour on me, and I hope on Scaevola as well, if, in the same way as you are wont to reply
about other matters when questions are asked of you, you will discourse about friendship,
and tell us what you think of it, of what nature you conceive it to be, and what maxims
you would lay down with regard to it.
Scaevola. It will indeed be agreeable to me, and I was essaying to
make that very request of you, when Fannius anticipated me. Therefore you will confer a
great favour on both of us. |
V. 17. Laelius. I
should raise no objection to doing so, if I felt equal to the task: for the subject is a
splendid one, and, as Fannius has said, we are at leisure. But who am I, and what special
aptitude have I for the task? It is the custom of philosophers, and that too of Greek
philosophers, to have a subject set before them about which to argue extempore. But the
task is a great one, and requires no little practice. Wherefore I think you should enquire
concerning the points that can be discussed about friendship from those who make these
things their profession: I can only exhort you to place friendship before everything else
on earth; for there is nothing in such harmony with nature, or so well adapted alike to
prosperity and adversity.
18. Well, in the first place I feel that friendship can exist only among the
good; but I do not press this statement too far, as those do who go with more sublety into
these matters, perhaps correctly, but with little result for the general good; for they
say that no one is good, except the wise man. Let us grant by all means the truth of that
assertion; but they explain wisdom to be something which no mortal has as yet attained. We
however ought to have an eye to those things which occur in practice and everyday life,
not to those things which are imagined or desired. Never will I say that Gaius Fabricius,
or Manius Curius, or Titus Coruncanius, whom our ancestors adjudged wise, were wise
according to the standard of those philosophers. Let them, therefore, keep to themselves a
definition of wisdom which is both offensive and unmeaning; let them only grant that these
were good men. But they will not even do this, for they will declare that this cannot be
granted except to a wise man. 19. Let us do the best we can, then, with our own homespun
wit, as the proverb runs. Those who so conduct themselves and live in such a fashion that
their honour, their uprightness, their sense of justice, and their generosity are
approved; that they are unstained by avarice, or captice, or effrontery; that they are men
of strong principle, as those who were whom I have just mentioned--let us hold that these,
even as they have been thought good, also ought to be called good, on the ground that, so
far as men can, they follow Nature, the best guide to living well.
I can see clearly, that we were born under the condition that there should
exist among us all a certain social tie, and that the nearer each approached us, the
stronger it should be. Therefore fellow-citizens are of more account than foreigners, and
relations than strangers; for with these Nature herself has created friendship,--but this
has not sufficient stability. For in this respect friendship surpasses relationship,
because kindly feeling can be removed from relationship, whereas it cannot from
friendship; for when kindly feeling has vanished, the name of friendship disappears as
well, while that of relationship remains. 20. How great moreover the power of friendship
is can be most fully understood from the fact that, starting from the undefined social
bond among the human race which Nature herself has knit together, the whole idea has been
so contracted and drawn within narrow limits, that every union of affection takes place
between two or among a few persons. |
VI. Now friendship is nothing
else than perfect agreement on all divine and human things, joined to kindliness and
affection; and than this, wisdom alone being excepted, I am inclined to think that no
better gift has been given to man by the immortal gods. Some prefer riches, some good
health, some power, some office, many prefer even sensual pleasures. The last of these if
the attribute of beasts, and even the first-named are fleeting and unstable, for they
depend not so much on our own plans, as on the blind hazard of fortune. Those however who
place the greatest good in virtue make an admirable decision; but this very virtue both
creates and maintains friendship, nor can friendship by any means exist without virtue.
21. Let us now explain virtue according to the usage of our life and common talk, and not,
as certain philosophers do, measure it with high-flown grandiloquence; but let us hold as
good those who are so accounted, men like Paulus, Cato, Galus, Scipio, Philus. With these
our everyday life is satisfied, and let us pass by those ideal men who are not found
anywhere at all.
22. Among men of this kind therefore friendship has advantages so great, that
I can hardly describe them. In the first place, how can there be a "life worth
living," as Ennius says, which does not find repose in the mutual kindliness of a
friend? What can be more pleasant than to have one with whom you can venture to talk about
all things in the same way as with yourself? Where would there be such great advantage in
prosperity, unless you had one who should rejoice in it equally with yourself? Adversity
again would indeed be hard to endure without someone who would bear it with even greater
concern than yourself. Finally, all the other objects of desire are each as a rule adapted
to a single purpose only: riches, that you may enjoy them; influence, that you may be
honoured; public offices, that you may be extolled; pleasures, that you may rejoice;
health, that you may be free from pain and perform the functions of the body. But
friendship comprises a very great number of things; wherever you turn, she is at hand,
from no place is she shut out, never is she out of season, never troublesome; and so we do
not use water and fire, as the proverb goes, on more occasions than we do friendship. Nor
am I now speaking of common or ordinary friendship, which nevertheless is both delightful
and beneficial, but of true and flawless friendship, such as was that of those few men
whose names are proverbial. For friendship makes prosperity more bright, and adversity, by
dividing and sharing it, more supportable. |
VII. 23. Now while
friendship comprises very many and very great advantages, in one point she certainly
surpasses everything else, inasmuch as she sends forth the light of a good hope for the
future, and does not suffer the spirits to be weakened or to sink. For he who looks upon a
true friend looks upon a kind of reflexion of himself. Wherefore the absent are present,
the poor have plenty, the feeble are strong, and, what is still more difficult to assert,
the dead live; so great is the respect, the recollection, the regret on the part of their
friends that attends them. From which circumstance the death of those seems to be happy,
the life of these worthy of praise. Take away from our world the bond of kindly feeling,
and neither house nor city will be able to stand; the very land will cease to be tilled.
If it is not sufficiently understood how great is the power of friendship and concord, it
can be grasped from disagreements and quarrels. For what house is so firmly established,
what state so stable, that it cannot be utterly overthrown by animosities and dissensions?
From this consideration we can judge how much good there is in friendship.
24. They say indeed that a certain learned Agrigentine sang in Greek verses
like one inspired, that friendship unites and discord scatters those objects in the
constitution of things and the entire universe which are at rest, and those as well which
are in motion. And this statement all mortals not only understand but prove by experience.
Consequently if at any time any duty of a friend has been displayed in facing dangers or
sharing them, who does not extol the deed with the highest praise? What acclamations
lately rang throughout the whole theatre at the performance of the new play of my guest
and friend Marcus Pacuvius, when, the king not knowing which of the two was Orestes,
Pylades said that he was Orestes, so that he might be put to death in his stead, while
Orested maintained, as indeed was the case, that he was Orestes. The audience rose and
applauded at an imaginary incident; what do we think they would have done in real life?
Nature herself easily showed her power, inasmuch as men pronounced that what they
themselves could not do was rightly done in the case of another. Thus far I think I have
been able to say what are my opinions about friendship. If there are any further points to
be discussed--and I am sure that there are many--enquire, if it seems good to you, of
those who handle such matters.
25. Fannius. But we would rather hear from you; and yet I have also
often made enquiries for them, and listened to them willingly enough; but the texture of
your discourse is something quite different.
Scaevola. You would say so still more, Fannius, if you had been
present not so long ago in Scipio's gardens, when there was a discussion about the State.
What an advocate of justice was he then against the skilful speech of Philus!
Fannius. Nay, it was easy for the justest of men to defend justice.
Scaevola. What! and is it not an easy thing for him to make a
defense of friendship, who has won the greatest glory for having preserved it with the
utmost loyalty, firmness, and integrity? |
VIII. 26. Laelius.
This is indeed to use violence against me. What does it matter by what means you compel
me? You certainly use compulsion. For it is difficult, and not even fair, to resist the
earnest wishes of one's sons-in-law, especially in a good cause. Very often, therefore,
when I am thinking about friendship, the following point seems to me deserving of especial
consideration--whether the want of friendship was felt on account of weakness and poverty,
so that in giving and receiving benefits each man might receive from another, and pay back
in return that which he was unequal to accomplish by himself; or whether, while this was
indeed an attribute of friendship, its origin was more venerable and honourable, and
proceeded more directly from nature itself. For love, from which friendship received its
name, is the chief means to the formation of the bond of kindly feeling. For advantages
indeed are often received from those who under the pretence of friendship are courted and
have attention paid them as occasion demands; but in friendship there is neither feigning
nor pretence, and whatever feeling exists is real and sincere.
27. Wherefore it seems to me that friendship has sprung rather from nature
than from poverty, more through a certain bent of the mind together with a certain feeling
of affection than through calculation about the amount of advantage that the connection
was likely to bring. Its nature indeed can be observed even in certain beasts, which so
love their offspring up to a certain time, and are so loved by them, that their feelings
are easily discerned. And this in the case of man is much more evident, first of all from
that affection which exists between children and parents, and which cannot be destroyed
without horrible wickedness; and next it is evident on occasions when a sense of love
similar to that between parent and child has arisen, if we have met with someone, with
whose character and disposition we are in harmony, because in him we seem to see clearly a
certain bright light, as it were, of goodness and virtue.
28. For nothing is more lovable than virtue, nothing which more strongly
induces love, seeing that we love in a fashion, because of their virtue and goodness, even
those whom we have never seen. Who is there that does not recall with some affection and
kindly feeling the memory of Gaius Fabricius and Manius Curius, though he has never seen
them? On the other hand, who is there that does not hate Tarquinius Superbus, Spurius
Cassius, Spurius Maelius? There was a protracted struggle for empire in Italy against two
generals, Pyrrhus and Hannibal: for the one, on account of his uprightness, we have no
great aversion; the other, because of his cruelty, this state will always detest. |
IX. 29. Now if the power of
uprightness is so great that we love it even in those whom we have never seen, or what is
still more astonishing, even in an enemy, what wonder is it if the minds of men are
stirred when they seem to see the virtue and the goodness of those with whom they can be
united in friendship? And yet love is strengthened by the receiving of a service, by the
perception of a liking in others for us, and by the addition of close intercourse, and
when these things have been added to that first impulse of the mind and of the affection,
there blazes up a wonderful amount of kindly feeling. And if any think that this has its
origin in weakness, in order that there may be some person through whom each man may gain
what he lacks, they leave us an origin of friendship truly mean and (so to speak) far from
high-born, in wishing it to be the child of want and poverty. Now if this were so, the
fewer resources each person thought he possessed in himself, the better adapted he would
be for friendship; but this is far from being the case.
30. For the more confidence a man has in himself, and the more he is so
fortified by virtue and wisdom that he stands in need of no one, and judges that all his
elements of happiness depend on himself, the more does he excel in seeking out and
cultivating friendships. Just think. Was Africanus in need of me? No, indeed! And
asssuredly I was not in need of him; but I loved him through a certain admiration of his
virtue, and he in return loved me, perhaps for some good opinion which he had of my
character, and social intercourse increased the kindly feeling. But though advantages many
and great followed this friendship, yet it was not in the hope of these that our
attachment originated. 31. For just as we do a kindness and show generosity, not that we
may exact gratitude (for we are not usurers in the matters of benefits, but are by nature
inclined to liberality), so we think that friendship ought to be sought, not because we
are attracted by the hope of reward, but because the whole of its profit lies in the love
itself.
32. But those who, like brute beasts, refer everything to the standard of
sensual pleasure, dissent strongly from this opinion, and no wonder; for those who have
cast away all their thoughts on a thing so mean and contemptible, are capable of looking
up to nothing lofty, great, and divine. Wherefore let us exclude these teachers from our
discourse, and let us for our part feel convinced that it is from nature that the
sentiment of loving and the affection that springs from kindly feeling are born, when
intimation have been given of goodness. And those who have sought for this goodness,
devote themselves to it, and draw still nigher, in order that they may enjoy both the
society of the man whom they have begun to love, and also his moral character, and may be
commensurate and equal in love, and more inclined to confer favours than to ask them back.
And let there be between them a noble rivalry on this point. Thus both the greatest
advantages will be received from friendship, and its origin from nature will be alike more
dignified and more real than if it had been the child of weakness. For if it were
expediency that cemented friendships, a change in expediency would in its turn break them
up; but since nature cannot be changed, true friendships are everlasting. The origin
indeed of friendship you now perceive, unless you wish, perchance, to make some reply to
my views.
Fannius. Pray continue, Laelius; for by virtue of my right of
seniority I reply for my friend here, who is younger than I.
Scaevola. Quite right. And so let us listen. |
