Fall 1999: Week 8

L. ANNAEI SENECAE AD LUCILIUM EPISTULAE LXVI

   2. Errare mihi visus est, qui dixit

gratior et pulchro veniens e corpore virtus.

Non enim ullo honestamento eget; ipsa magnum sui decus est et corpus suum consecrat. 3. Potest ex casa vir magnus exire, potest et ex deformi humilique corpusculo formosus animus ac magnus. Quosdam itaque mihi videtur in hoc tales natura generare, ut adprobet virtutem omni loco nasci. Si posset per se nudos edere animos, fecisset; nunc, quod amplius est, facit; quosdam enim edit corporibus inpeditos, sed nihilominus perrumpentes obstantia. 4. Claranus mihi videtur in exemplar editus, ut scire possemus non deformitate corporis foedari animum, sed pulchritudine animi corpus ornari.

2. The poet is, in my opinion, mistaken who sang

Worth shows more pleasing in a form that’s fair,

For virtue needs nothing to set it off; it is its own great glory, and it hallows the body in which it dwells. A great man can spring from a hovel; so can a beautiful and great soul from an ugly and insignificant body. For this reason Nature seems to me to breed certain men of this stamp with the idea of proving that virtue springs into birth in any place whatever. Had it been possible for her to produce souls by themselves and naked, she would have done so; as it is, Nature does a still greater thing, for she produces certain men, who though hampered in their bodies, nonetheless break through the obstruction. I think Claranus has been produced as a pattern, that we might be enabled to understand that the soul is not disfigured by the ugliness of the body, but rather the opposite, that the body is beautified by the comeliness of the soul.

6...animus intuens vera, peritus fugiendorum ac petendorum, non ex opinione, sed ex natura pretia rebus inponens, toti se inserens mundo et in omnes eius actus contemplationem suam mittens, cogitationibus actionibusque intentus, ex aequo magnus ac vehemens, asperis blandisque pariter invictus, neutri se fortunae summittens, supra omnia quae contingunt acciduntque eminens, pulcherrimus, ordinatissimus cum decore tum viribus, sanus ac siccus, inperturbatus, intrepidus, quem nulla vis frangat, quem nec adtollant fortuita nec deprimant; talis animus virtus est. 8. Quidquid attigit, in similitudinem sui adducit et tinguit; actiones, amicitias, interdum domos totas, quas intravit disposuitque, condecorat. Quidquid tractavit, id amabile, conspicuum, mirabile facit.

6. ...the soul that gazes upon truth, that is skilled in what should be sought and what should be avoided, establishing standards of value not according to opinion, but according to nature,–the soul that penetrates the whole world and directs its contemplating gaze upon all its phenomena, paying strict attention to thoughts and actions, equally great and forceful, superior alike to hardships and blandishments, yielding itself to neither extreme of fortune, rising above all blessings and tribulations, absolutely beautiful, perfectly equipped with grace as well as with strength, healthy and sinewy, unruffled, undismayed, one which no violence can shatter, one which acts of chance can neither exalt nor depress,–a soul like this is virtue itself. 8. Whatever it has touched it brings into likeness with itself, and dyes with its own color. It adorns our actions, our friendships, and sometimes entire households which it has entered and set in order. Whatever it has handled it forthwith makes lovable, notable, admirable.

12. ...Paria itaque sunt et gaudium et fortis atque obstinata tormentorum perpessio; in utroque enim eadem est animi magnitudo, in altero remissa et laeta, in altera pugnax et intenta. 13. Quid? Tu non putas parem esse virtutem eius, qui fortiter hostium moenia expugnat, et eius, qui obsidionem patientissime sustinet? Magnus Scipio, qui Numantiam cludit et conprimit cogitque invictas manus in exitium ipsas suum verti; magnus ille obsessorum animus, qui scit non esse clusum, cui mors aperta est, et in conplexu libertatis expirat. Aeque reliqua quoque inter se paria sunt, tranquillitas, simplicitas, liberalitas, constantia, aequanimitas, tolerantia. Omnibus enim istis una virtus subest, quae animum rectum et indeclinabilem praestat.

12. ...Therefore it follows that joy and a brave unyielding endurance of torture are equal goods; for in both there is the same greatness of souls, relaxed and cheerful in the one case, in the other combative and braced for action. 13. What? Do you not think that the virtue of him who bravely storms the enemy’s stronghold is equal to that of him who endures a siege with the utmost patience? Great is Scipio when he invests Numantia, and constrains and compels the hands of an enemy, whom he could not conquer, to resort to their own destruction. Great also are the souls of the defenders–men who know that, as long as the path to death lies open, the blockade is not complete, men who breathe their last in liberty. In like manner, the other virtues are also equal as compared with one another: tranquillity, simplicity, generosity, constancy, equanimity, endurance. For underlying them all is a single virtue–that which renders the soul straight and unswerving.

14. "Quid ergo? Nihil interest inter gaudium et dolorum inflexibilem patientiam?" Nihil, quantum ad ipsas virtutes; plurimum inter illa, in quibus virtus utraque ostenditur. In altero enim naturalis est animi remissio ac laxitas, in altero contra naturam dolor. Itaque media sunt haec, quae plurimum intervalli recipiunt; virtus in utroque par est.

14. "What then," you say; "is there no difference between joy and unyielding endurance of pain?" None at all, as regards the virtues themselves; very great, however, in the circumstances in which either of these two virtues is displayed. In the one case, there is the natural relaxation and loosening of the soul; in the other there is an unnatural pain. Hence these circumstances, between which a great distinction can be drawn, belong to the category of indifferent things, but the virtue shown in each case is equal.

15. Virtutem materia non mutat; nec peiorem facit dura ac difficilis, nec meliorem hilaris et laeta. Necesse est ergo par sit. In utraque enim quod fit, aeque recte fit, aeque prudenter, aeque honeste. Ergo aequalia sunt bona, ultra quae nec hic potest se melius in hoc gaudio gerere nec ille melius in illis cruciatibus. Duo autem, quibus nihil fieri melius potest, paria sunt.

15. Virtue is not changed by the matter with which it deals; if the matter is hard and stubborn, it does not make the virtue worse; if pleasant and joyous, it does not make it better. Therefore, virtue necessarily remains equal. For, in each case, what is done is done with equal uprightness, with equal wisdom, and with equal honor. Hence the states of goodness involved are equal, and it is impossible for a man to transcend these states of goodness by conducting himself better, either the one man in his joy, or the other amid his suffering. And two goods, neither of which can possibly be better, are equal.

16. Nam si, quae extra virtutem posita sunt, aut minuere illam aut augere possunt, desinit unum bonum esse, quod honestum. Si hoc concesseris, omne honestum perit. Quare? Dicam: quia nihil honestum est, quod ab invito, quod coactum fit. Omne honestum voluntarium est. admisce illi pigritiam, querellam, tergiversationem, metum; quod habet in se optimum, perdidit, sibi placere. Non potest honestum esse, quod non est liberum; nam quod timet, servit.

16. For if things which are extrinsic to virtue can either diminish or increase virtue, then that which is honorable ceases to be the only good. If you grant this, honor has wholly perished. And why? Let me tell you: it is because no act is honorable that is done by an unwilling agent, that is compulsory. Every honorable act is voluntary. Alloy it with reluctance, complaints, cowardice, or fear, and it loses its best characteristic–self-approval. That which is not free cannot be honorable; for fear means slavery.

17. Honestum omne securum est, tranquillum est; si recusat aliquid, si conplorat, si malum iudicat, perturbationem recepit et in magna discordia volutatur. Hinc enim species recti vocat, illinc suspicio mali retrahit. Itaque qui honeste aliquid facturus est, quicquid opponitur, id etiam si incommodum putat, malum non putet, velit, libens faciat. Omne honestum iniussum incoactumque est, sincerum et nulli malo mixtum.

17. The honorable is wholly free from anxiety and is calm; if it ever objects, laments, or regards anything as an evil, it becomes subject to disturbance and begins to flounder about amid great confusion. For on one side the semblance of right calls to it, on the other the suspicion of evil drags it back. Therefore, when a man is about to do something honorable, he should not regard any obstacle as evils, even though he regard as inconvenient, but he should will to do the deed, and do it willingly. For every honorable act is done without commands or compulsion; it is unalloyed and contains no admixture of evil.