Tum
porro quoniam est extremum quodque cacumen . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . .
corporis illius quod nostri cernere sensus
iam nequeunt; id nimirum sine partibus extat
et minima constat natura nec fuit umquam
per se secretum neque posthac esse valebit,
alterius quoniamst ipsum pars primaque et una,
inde aliae atque aliae similes ex ordine partes
agmine condenso naturam corporis explent,
quae quoniam per se nequeunt constare, necessest
haerere unde queant nulla ratione revelli.
sunt igitur solida primordia simplicitate
quae minimis stipata cohaerent partibus arte,
non ex illarum conventu conciliata,
sed magis aeterna pollentia simplicitate,
unde neque avelli quicquam neque deminui iam
concedit natura reservans semina rebus.
praeterea nisi erit minimum, parvissima quaeque
corpora constabunt ex partibus infinitis,
quippe ubi dimidiae partis pars semper habebit
dimidiam partem nec res praefiniet ulla.
ergo rerum inter summam minimamque quid escit?
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Then further,
since there is always in bodies an extreme point [which seems to us
the very smallest, there must also be a smallest point] in the atom,
which our senses are no longer able to perceive: that undoubtedly
is without parts, and consists of the smallest possible substance,
and it has never existed apart by itself nor will ever have force
to do so, since it is essentially a part of the other, a first part
with unity of its own, and then other and other like parts, each in
its own place, fill up the nature of the atom in a condensed mass;
all which, since they cannot exist separately, must necessarily so
adhere to the whole that they cannot by any means be torn away. The
first-beginnings therefore are of solid singleness, made of these
smallest parts closely packed and cohering together, not compounded
by the gathering of these parts, but strong rather by their eternal
singleness, and from these nature allows nothing to be torn away or
diminished any longer, but keeps them as seeds for things. Besides,
unless there is to be a smallest something, each minutest body will
consist of infinite parts, since of course a half of the half of anything
will always have a half of its own, and there will be no limit to
the division. Then what difference will there be between the sum of
things and the least of things? |
nil erit ut distet; nam quamvis funditus
omnis
summa sit infinita, tamen, parvissima quae sunt,
ex infinitis constabunt partibus aeque.
quod quoniam ratio reclamat vera negatque
credere posse animum, victus fateare necessest
esse ea quae nullis iam praedita partibus extent
et minima constent natura. quae quoniam sunt,
illa quoque esse tibi solida atque aeterna fatendum.
denique si minimas in partis cuncta resolvi
cogere consuesset rerum natura creatrix,
iam nil ex illis eadem reparare valeret
propterea quia, quae nullis sunt partibus aucta,
non possunt ea quae debet genitalis habere
materies, varios conexus pondera plagas
concursus motus, per quae res quaeque geruntur. |
There will
be no difference; for although the whole sum of things be absolutely
infinite, yet the bodies which are minutest will equally consist of
infinite parts. But since true reasoning protests and denies that
the mind can believe it, you must yield and confess that there are
at last things which consist of no parts and are of the smallest possible
substance. And since they exist, you must also confess that they are
solid and everlasting. Lastly, if nature the maker had been wont to
compel all things to be resolved into their smallest parts, ere this
that same nature would have proved unable to make anything again out
of them, because since they are composed of no parts they cannot have
what generative matter must have, various connexions, weights, blows,
concurrences, motions, by which things are severally brought to pass.
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