Fall 1999: Week 6

M. TULLI CICERONI
TUSCULANARUM DISPUTATIONUM LIBRI
LIB. I CAP. 9-11

M. Mors igitur ipsa, quae videtur notissima res esse, quid sit, primum est videndum. Sunt enim qui discessum animi a corpore putent esse mortem; sunt qui nullum censeant fieri discessum, sed una animum et corpus occidere, animumque in corpore extingui. Qui discedere animum censent, alii statim dissipari, alii diu permanere, alii semper. Quid sit porro ipse animus aut ubi aut unde, magna dissensio est. Aliis cor ipsum animus videtur, ex quo excordes, vaecordes concordesque dicuntur et Nasica ille prudens bis consul Corculum et

   M. We ought, then, first to see what death, which seems to be thoroughly well known, really is. There are those who think that death is a separation of the soul from the body, and others who maintain that there is no separation, but that soul and body perish together, the soul being extinguished in the body. Of those who think that the soul leaves the body, some say that it is immediately dispersed so as to have no longer a separate existence; others, that it continues long in being; others still, that it lives on forever. Then again, there is a wide difference of opinion as to what the soul is, or where, or whence. Some suppose that the heart is the soul, whence the terms heartless, foolish-hearted, of kindred heart, and the name given to that wise Nasica who was twice consul, Dear Little Heart, and

Egregie cordatus homo, catus Aelius Sextus.

"The noble-hearted Catus Aelius Sextus."

Empedocles animum esse censet cordi suffusum sanguinem; aliis pars quaedam cerebri visa est animi principatum tenere; aliis nec cor ipsum placet nec cerebri quandam partem esse animum, sed alii in corde, alii in cerebro dixerunt animi esse sedem et locum; animum autem alii animam, ut fere nostri (declarant nomina; nam et agere animam et efflare dicimus et animosos et bene animatos et ex animi sententia; ipse autem animus ab anima dictus est); Zenoni Stoico animus ignis videtur.

Empedocles thinks that the blood diffused through the heart constitutes the soul. Some suppose that a certain portion of the brain holds the sovereignty that belongs to the soul. Others are not satisfied with regarding the heart or any part of the brain as the soul, and of these some say that the soul has its seat or dwelling-place in the heart; some, in the brain. Yet others--and such is the general opinion in my school of philosophy--think that the breath or spirit constitutes the soul. Indeed, we use the term breath or spirit to denote soul, as to draw and to exhale the vital breath, and spirited, and of right spirit, and in harmony with one's spirit. Moreover our word for soul is derived from the word that means breath. Still further, Zeno the Stoic supposed the soul to be fire.

   X. Sed haec quidem, quae dixi, cor, cerebrum, animam, ignem vulgo; reliqua fere singuli, ut multo ante veteres, proxime autem Aristoxenus, musicus idemque philosophus, ipsius corporis intentionem quandam, velut in cantu et fidibus quae harmonia dicitur; sic ex corporis totius natura et figura varios motus cieri tamquam in cantu sonos. Hie ab artificio suo non recessit et tamen dixit aliquid, quod ipsum quale esset, erat multo ante et dictum et explanatum a Platone. Xenocrates animi figuram et quasi corpus negavit esse, [verum] numerum dixit esse, cuius vis, ut iam ante Pythagorae visum erat, in natura maxuma esset. Eius doctor Plato triplicem finxit animum, cuius principatum, id est rationem, in capite sicut in arce posuit, et duas partes ei parere voluit, iram et cupiditatem, quas suis locis, iram in pectore, cupiditatem subter praecordia, locavit.

   10. These beliefs as to the soul's being heart, blood, brain, breath, fire, have been largely diffused; others have had a more limited acceptance. Many of the ancients, and latest among them Aristoxenus, who was both a musician and a philosopher, maintained that the soul is a certain tension of the members and organs of the body analogous to what is called harmony in singing or in stringed instruments, so that the various movements of the human being are called forth from the nature and conformation of the body, like sounds in music. Aristoxenus adhered to his theory, and yet its real significance and value had long before been stated and explained by Plato. Xenocrates denied that the soul has form or anything corresponding to body, but said that it consists of number, which, as Pythagoras had already taught, is the greatest force in nature. Plato, the teacher of Xenocrates, made the soul threefold, placing its sovereign, reason, in the head; while he separated the two parts subject to its command, anger and desire, giving to anger its seat in the breast, and to desire, under the diaphragm.

   Dicaearchus autem in eo sermone, quem Corinthi habitum tribus libris exponit, doctorum hominum disputantium primo libro multos loquentis facit; duobus Pherecraten quendam Phthiotam senem, quem ait a Deucalione ortum, disserentem inducit nihil esse omnino animum, et hoc esse nomen totum inane, frustraque animalia et animantis appellari, neque in homine inesse animum vel animam nec in bestia, vimque omnem eam, qua vel agamus quid vel sentiamus, in omnibus corporibus vivis aequabiliter esse fusam nec separabilem a corpore esse, quippe quae nulla sit nec sit quicquam nisi corpus unum et simplex, ita figuratum, ut temperatione naturae vigeat et sentiat. Aristoteles, longe omnibus (Platonem semper excipio) praestans et ingenio et diligentia, cum quattuor nota illa genera principiorum esset complexus, e quibus omnia orerentur, quintam quandam naturam censet esse, e qua sit mens. Cogitare enim et providere et discere et docere et invenire aliquid et tam multa alia meminisse, amare odisse, cupere timere, angi laetari, haec et similia eorum in horum quattuor generum inesse nullo putat; quintum genus adhibet vacans nomine et sic ipsum animum endelecheian appellat novo nomine quasi quandam continuatam motionem et perennem.

   Dicaearchus, in the three books which purport to contain the discussions of certain learned men at Corinth, introduces many speakers in the first book, and in the other two, Pherecrates, an old man from Phthia, whom he calls a descendant of Deucalion, who maintains that the soul is nothing at all, that it is a mere empty name, that such terms as animals and animated beings are unmeaning, that there is no soul or mind in either man or beast, and that all the force with which we either act or feel is equally diffused in all bodies, and is inseparable from body, indeed, has no existence of its own, so that nothing exists save body sole and simple, so shaped that it can live and feel by virtue of its natural organism. Aristotle, far transcending all but Plato in genius and in industry, recognizing the four primitive elements in which all things had their origin, maintains that there is a fifth natural substance from which mind is derived; for it appears to him that to reflect, to foresee, to learn, to teach, to invent, and so many other things, to remember, to love, to hate, to desire, to fear, to be grieved, to be glad,--these and the like cannot have their source in the four elements. He adds to them a fifth, for which he finds no existing name, and he therefore calls the soul by a new name, Intellect, as if it were prolonged and perpetual motion.

XI. Nisi quae me forte fugiunt, haec sunt fere de animo sententiae. Democritum enim, magnum illum quidem virum, sed levibus et rotundis corpusculis efficientem animum concursu quodam fortuito, omittamus; nihil est enim apud istos, quod non atomorum turba conficiat. Harum sententiarum quae vera sit, deus aliqui viderit; quae veri simillima, magna quaestio est. Utrum igitur inter has sententias diiudicare malumus an ad propositum redire?

11. Unless some have escaped my memory, these are nearly all the opinions concerning the soul; for we may leave out of account Democritus, who, great man as he was, yet regarded the soul as resulting from a certain fortuitous concourse of smooth and round particles of matter. Forsooth, in the opinion of philosophers of this class, there is nothing which cannot be brought to pass by the swirl of atoms. Which of the opinions that I have named is true, some god must determine; which is the most probable is the great question for us. Shall we attempt to discriminate among them, or shall we return to our original purpose?

A. Cuperem equidem utrumque, si posset, sed est difficile confundere. Quare si, ut ista non disserantur, liberari mortis metu possumus, id agamus; sin id non potest nisi hac quaestione animorum explicata, nunc, si videtur, hoe, illud alias.

A. I should be glad of both, were it possible; but it is difficult to pursue both lines of discussion together. Therefore, if without treating of these opinions we can get rid of the fear of death, let this be our present endeavor; but if this requires the previous discussion of the origin of souls, such discussion must have the precedence, and the other subject must be postponed.

M. Quod malle te intellego, id puto esse commodius. Efficiet enim ratio, ut, quaecumque vera sit eorum sententiarum, quas exposui, mors aut malum non sit aut sit bonum potius. Nam si cor aut sanguis aut cerebrum est animus, certe, quoniam est corpus, interibit cum reliquo corpore; si anima est, fortasse dissipabitur; si ignis, extinguetur; si est Aristoxeni harmonia, dissolvetur. Quid de Dicaearcho dicam, qui nihil omnino animum dicat esse? His sententiis omnibus nihil post mortem pertinere ad quemquam potest; pariter enim cum vita sensus amittitur; non sentientis autem, nihil est, ullam in partem quod intersit. Reliquorum sententiae spem adferunt, si to hoe forte delectat, posse animos, cum e corporibus excesserint, in caelum quasi in domicilium suum pervenire.

M. I regard the course which you propose as the more suitable; for reason will show that, whichever of the opinions that I have named may be true, death is either no evil, or--still more--is a good. For if the soul is heart, or blood, or brain, since it is body, it will perish with the rest of the body; if it is breath, it will be dissipated; if fire, it will be quenched; if the harmony of Aristoxenus, it will be dissolved. What shall I say about Dicaearchus, who asserts that the soul is nothing at all? According to all these opinions nothing that belongs to any man can remain after death; for consciousness is lost equally with life, and to one who has no consciousness no event, prosperous or adverse, can be of any concern. The opinions of the other philosophers whom I have named offer the hope--if that gives you pleasure--that the soul when it departs from the body may pass on to heaven, as to its own proper home.

A. Me vero delectat, idque primum ita esse velim, deinde, etiamsi non sit, mihi persuaderi tamen velim.

A. This hope is truly delightful to me. I would desire it first of all, and even were it not true, I should want to be convinced of it.

M. Quid tibi ergo opera nostra opus est? num eloquentia Platonem superare possumus? Evolve diligenter eius eum librum, qui est do animo; amplius quod desideres, nihil erit.

M. What need then is there of any help from me? Can I surpass Plato in eloquence? Study carefully his book about the soul, and you can ask for nothing more.