Graph Based Social Choice Procedures

Dr. Peter Slater

Department of Mathematical Sciences
University of Alabama in Huntsville

September 20, 2002
202 Madison Hall
3:00 PM (Coffee and Cookies at 2:30)

Abstract

Voting scenarios in which we have a finite set C of candidates and a finite set V of voters, and for which each voter rank orders (total orders) the candidates will be examined. It is known that no social choice procedure for selecting the winner can satisfy a (small) set of reasonable conditions. What happens when voters are assumed to be rational (in particular, basing their ordering on distances in graphs) will be examined.

Voting scenarios in which we have a finite set C of candidates and a finite set V of voters, and for which each voter rank orders (total orders) the candidates will be examined. It is known that no social choice procedure for selecting the winner can satisfy a (small) set of reasonable conditions. What happens when voters are assumed to be rational (in particular, basing their ordering on distances in graphs) will be examined.